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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) COUNTING RULES SUBGROUP MEETING,
DECEMBER 10, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1198 SFO-GVA-VII-103

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-110.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: December 8, 2009
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) In an intense exchange at a meeting of the Counting Rules Subgroup held at the Russian Mission on December 8, 2009, the Russian side focused on getting a detailed understanding of the U.S. concept for ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber counting rules. The U.S. side explained the reasoning behind the concept of not/not considering the B-52G, Peacekeeper (MX) Missile, Minuteman II, and Trident I as existing types, and the counting of the B-1B under the START Follow-on (SFO) treaty. The Russian side questioned the application of the Inspection Protocol under the U.S. side's interpretation and the usefulness of the U.S.-proposed agreed joint statements. End Summary.

[1](#)4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: When is an ICBM/SLBM Deployed?; What Exactly is an Existing Type?; Round Two - Heavy Bomber Counting Rules; and Article III.

WHEN IS AN ICBM/SLBM DEPLOYED?

15. (S) ADM Kuznetsov focused the initial discussions of the Counting Rules Meeting toward exploring the U.S. position on when ICBMs, SLBMs, and their associated launchers were considered to be deployed versus non-deployed to better understand the implications of the sub-limits set out in Article IV. These had been introduced in a previous meeting of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (Ref A). Since the terms "deployed ICBM" and "deployed SLBM" had already been agreed, further clarification of "non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs" was solicited. Mr. Taylor explained the U.S. willingness to drop "considered to contain" was the reasoning behind the U.S. acceptance of these terms. (Begin comment: Any specific crafting of SFO definitions were deferred to the Definitions Working Group. End comment.) Both sides agreed that if an ICBM was removed from its launcher it would be a "non-deployed ICBM," even, for example, if it was in a storage area. A "non-deployed launcher of ICBMs" is a launcher with no ICBM on it. Col Zaitsev asked about the inspection implications of this but the U.S. side deferred this question to the Inspection Protocol Working Group.

WHAT EXACTLY IS AN EXISTING TYPE?

16. (S) The Russian side noted that in analyzing the U.S.

list of existing types shown in Article III, the MX Missile, Minuteman II and Trident I were not included. Taylor explained that the U.S. concept defined existing types as ICBMs, SLBMs or heavy bombers, a type of ICBM, SLBM or heavy bomber for which at least one ICBM, SLBM or heavy bomber of that type was deployed on the date of signature of the treaty, as set out in Article III, paragraph 7. Taylor outlined the facts that the United States has no MX missiles installed on any MX launchers, and no Trident I SLBMs installed in any Trident launcher. Therefore, the United States did not consider these systems to be existing types under the SFO treaty. Russian inspectors saw that there were no MX missiles in silos and General Jones has committed that these silos would be eliminated within the next 7 years. Taylor stated that the way the accounting would be done remained to be worked out but under the U.S. concept these ICBMs were not existing types. Later, Gen Poznikhir insisted that the Russian side had not yet agreed that the MX would not/not be an existing type.

17. (S) During the exchange, Kuznetsov pushed back by asking whether they stopped being strategic offensive arms (SOA) at the end of START, to which Taylor responded that the MX ICBM and the Trident I SLBM ceased to be SOA subject to the provisions of the START Treaty on December 5, 2009. With respect to the SFO treaty, the United States did not consider these ballistic missiles to be SOA subject to the terms of the treaty and therefore not subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Article II. Kuznetsov also asked whether the United States would care if the RSM-52 (SS-N-20) submarine (Typhoon) was not considered an existing type because there were no plans for using it as a missile system. Taylor explained that it would be considered an existing type according to the type rule because SLBMs of that type would be deployed at the time of treaty signature. When pushed about SSGNs, he responded that the same rule applied for the type of launcher of SLBMs. At numerous times during the discussions the Russian side listed U.S. SOA numbers taken from the START database and asked whether these would be counted as existing types. Poznikhir accused the United States of walking away from the old START Treaty.

18. (S) Kuznetsov asked why the MX launchers were not eliminated under START and was told that it was a matter of available funding. He was also displeased that the United

States was planning to use the remaining MX missiles for other purposes, as was allowed under START, rather than eliminating them. He explained that Russia had plans and funding for the elimination of their unused systems. Taylor reminded the Russian side numerous times during the meeting that they had not yet provided the U.S. side with its list of existing types and asked when the information would be shared.

¶9. (S) The back and forth exchange continued in order to fully explore the implications of the U.S. position on existing types and counting, with the sides questioning how specific examples would be counted. During the discussion on access for an inspection team, the Russian side realized that it would be possible to exclude operational launchers on the site. Kuznetsov opined that having no "former type" in the SFO treaty was a problem that would result in having SOA that did not exist on paper but did in reality, and the U.S. concept would allow for circumvention of the treaty.

Ultimately, Poznikhir stated that Russia "will have to create a mirror image of how you view existing types" and develop ideas on existing types now that the U.S. position was better understood.

ROUND TWO - HEAVY BOMBER COUNTING RULES

¶10. (S) Turning to heavy bombers, Kuznetsov asked for clarification on whether heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments had any location or numerical limits. Taylor responded by saying that to his knowledge, at this time, there were no restrictions. Kuznetsov asked whether a deployed heavy bomber remained deployed after it flew to the location where it would be awaiting elimination. Taylor said the U.S. side considered the heavy bomber awaiting elimination based at its home base and counted as a deployed heavy bomber until elimination was completed, regardless of where it was located.

¶11. (S) Poznikhir asked whether the 47 B-52G heavy bombers would be considered deployed. The U.S. side explained that these heavy bombers were planned for elimination and that General Jones committed that the B-52Gs would be eliminated within the 7-year period after EIF. The bomber would not be considered an existing type and therefore not a deployed heavy bomber. This resulted in Kuznetsov accusing the United States of a selective approach, as was presented with respect to ICBMs.

¶12. (S) The discussion continued as Taylor endeavored to answer Zaitsev's questions regarding the B-1B and the U.S. offer of continued assurance, through an agreed statement, that the heavy bombers remain incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. The U.S. side responded that once all the B-1Bs were converted, and no longer equipped for nuclear armaments, they would no longer be subject to the treaty or counted against the limit on strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs). A draft joint agreement had been proposed to provide Russia with assurances in place of inspections and database reporting. Mr. Dean confirmed that the agreed statement would be included in the treaty package and would supersede the other terms of the treaty as they might relate to the B-1B. In response, Zaitsev asked why the Russian side would want to visit to confirm conversion if the heavy bombers were not subject to the treaty--what would be the basis for verification? And, the same principle applied for the SSGNS. The U.S. side had proposed another agreed statement as a compromise to bridge the different concepts in order to provide assurances during the lifetime of the treaty.

ARTICLE III

¶13. (S) The discussion transitioned to the treaty article regarding existing types and ways to represent the existing

types of Russian ICBMs that could be launched from silos or mobile launchers. Because the Russian input had not yet been provided there was no progress on this text.

¶14. (S) Taylor proposed deleting the brackets in paragraph

2(b), except for the attribution number, but Kuznetsov was not able to agree at this time. Zaitsev complained that if this article did not mention the number of warheads then everything in the Inspection Protocol would be ruined.

¶15. (S) Finally, the U.S. side proposed dropping sub-paragraphs 6(b) and (c) on new types of ballistic missiles and the Russia side requested to see these changes reflected in a document so as to consider the implications of dropping the two sub-paragraphs.

¶16. (U) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

-- Heavy Bombers, U.S. Non-Paper, December 7, 2009.

¶17. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Taylor
Mr. Broshar
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Dr. Dreicer
Dr. Fraley
Ms. Miller
Mrs. Zdraveky
Mr. French (Int)

RUSSIA

ADM Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Mr. Ivanov
Col Kamenskiy
Mr. Lobach
Ms. Melikbekian
Gen Poznikhir
Col Zaitsev
Mr. Pogodin (Int)

¶18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS